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Rawls [3], “Justice as Fairness” (1958)

In this essay Rawls investigates 'justice' as a property of social institutions (practices).  What does it mean to describe an institution as just/unjust? He criticizes a utilitarian conception of justice, according to which an institution is just if it maximizes welfare, on the grounds that a social institution might maximize welfare at the expense of … Continue reading Rawls [3], “Justice as Fairness” (1958) →

Dostoevsky’s Early Years and Poor Folk – or – “The Dickensian Aspect”

The rule I’ve set for myself is to read up until the point where Frank treats of a particular text at length, then to stop, read that text, then read what Frank has to say about it, and then respond, both to Frank, but also, more importantly, to Dostoevsky’s work itself. The first 136 pages … Continue reading Dostoevsky’s Early Years and Poor Folk – or – “The Dickensian Aspect” →

Rawls [2], “Two Concepts of Rules,” (1955)

In this essay Rawls introduces a distinction between justifying a practice and justifying particular actions within a practice.  The distinction is important, for it shows how utilitarians might rebut the common criticism that they are committed to endorsing acts like punishing the innocent and breaking promises when doing so will maximize the good.  The main … Continue reading Rawls [2], “Two Concepts of Rules,” (1955) →

Weakness of Will

According to the traditional philosophical analysis of weakness of will, the weak-willed agent acts contrary to her all-things-considered judgment concerning what she ought to do.  This analysis is content-neutral, in the sense that it is not supposed to matter what the agent has concluded she ought to do--whatever it is, straying from that course of … Continue reading Weakness of Will →

Rawls [1]: “Outline of a Decision Procedure in Ethics” (1951)

Most generally, this essay is about how to show that a given moral principle is 'objectively valid' and that actions in accordance with that principle are 'objectively right.'  The central claim, so far as I can tell, is that a moral principle is objectively valid if it explains, better than any alternative principle, the "considered … Continue reading Rawls [1]: “Outline of a Decision Procedure in Ethics” (1951) →