Broome on Rawls: A Puzzle

In Parfit's Reasons and Persons, there is an interesting appendix on "Rawlsian Principles" in which the economist and philosopher John Broome raises an objection to Rawls's Difference Principle (an objection apparently inspired by some opening remarks by Parfit).  That principle, recall, states that "social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are...to … Continue reading Broome on Rawls: A Puzzle

Rawls [2], “Two Concepts of Rules,” (1955)

In this essay Rawls introduces a distinction between justifying a practice and justifying particular actions within a practice.  The distinction is important, for it shows how utilitarians might rebut the common criticism that they are committed to endorsing acts like punishing the innocent and breaking promises when doing so will maximize the good.  The main … Continue reading Rawls [2], “Two Concepts of Rules,” (1955)

Weakness of Will

According to the traditional philosophical analysis of weakness of will, the weak-willed agent acts contrary to her all-things-considered judgment concerning what she ought to do.  This analysis is content-neutral, in the sense that it is not supposed to matter what the agent has concluded she ought to do--whatever it is, straying from that course of … Continue reading Weakness of Will

Rawls [1]: “Outline of a Decision Procedure in Ethics” (1951)

Most generally, this essay is about how to show that a given moral principle is 'objectively valid' and that actions in accordance with that principle are 'objectively right.'  The central claim, so far as I can tell, is that a moral principle is objectively valid if it explains, better than any alternative principle, the "considered … Continue reading Rawls [1]: “Outline of a Decision Procedure in Ethics” (1951)